Allocating Losses from Forged Indorsements between Negligent Drawers and Depositary Banks: Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank by Mershon, Steven W.
19801
Allocating Losses from Forged Indorsements between
Negligent Drawers and Depositary Banks:
Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank
I. INTRODUCTION
Articles Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code provide
intricate machinery for allocating losses caused by the forgery of
signatures on negotiable instruments. Instances arise, however, that are
not expressly covered by the Code. In these situations, courts are called
upon to interpret the law in the absence of any legislative directive. In
developing this common law, the courts often have followed pre-Code
decisions without determining the appropriateness of their application of
such precedent in the modern commercial context.' As might be expected,
the results frequently are unjust.
The facts of Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank2 presented the
federal district court with such a situation. In Girard it was alleged that an
employee of a negligent drawer of a check had stolen and negotiated the
check by forging the indorsement of the payee's name.3 The check was
deposited in a collecting bank,4 Mount Holly State Bank, and later paid by
the drawee, Girard Bank. Rather than charge the amount of the check to
its customer/ drawer, however, Girard sued Mount Holly for breach of its
warranty of good title, which Mount Holly had made pursuant to the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.5 Because the Code does not
explicitly provide any method for a collecting bank to pass this liability on
to the negligent drawer, Mount Holly ordinarily would have been forced to
bear this loss.
Nevertheless, the court in Girard decided to transfer this loss from the
innocent collecting bank to the negligent drawer. In so doing, the court
considered two possible alternative solutions to the lack of remedy
problem: first, a requirement that the drawee assert all possible negligence
defenses against the drawer of a check before proceeding against prior
collecting banks on a breach of warranty action; or second, creation of a
cause of action in common law negligence in favor of the collecting bank
1. See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441
(1979). But see Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 737 (1978).
2. 474 F.Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
3. Id. at 1229.
4. "Depositary bank" is defined in § 4-105 of the U.C.C. as the "first bank to which an item is
transferred for collection." "Collecting bank" is also defined there as "any bank handling the item for
collection except the payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105. Throughout this Case Comment, unless otherwise
indicated, collecting bank will be used to refer both to any collecting bank and to the deopsitary bank.
When differentiation of the terms is intended, the text will refer to the depositary bank specifically.
5. See note 23 and accompanying text infra.
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and against the drawer. In reaching its decision, the court adopted the
latter possibility.
This Case Comment will briefly consider the system by which losses
caused by forged indorsements on checks6 are allocated under both pre-
Code law and the Uniform Commercial Code and will explain how the
operation of the Code provisions results in a lack of remedy for a collecting
bank that finds itself in a Girard-type situation. The two solutions
entertained by the court in Girard will be analyzed in light of the objectives
of a system of loss allocation for negotiable instruments. Finally, while
supporting the court's decision to impose liability for forged indorsements
upon the negligent drawer, this Case Comment will demonstrate that the
alternative not adopted by the court, requiring the drawee to assert the
drawer's negligence, would have been the preferable solution.
II. THE SYSTEM OF ALLOCATING LOSSES CAUSED BY
FORGED INDORSEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF
PRE-CODE AND U.C.C. RULES
The losses caused by forged indorsements on checks under both the
Code and pre-Code law usually fall upon the first solvent party in the chain
of transferors after the forger.7 The manner in which a party handles a
check, or his lack of good faith in so doing, however, may alter this general
rule of loss allocation. In these instances the loss occasioned by the forgery
usually will fall upon that party.8
Similarly, when a party is negligent in handling a check, the loss
caused by the forged indorsement usually will fall upon that party.9 The
rule of "allocation by negligence" is altered, however, by the inability of a
party to assert the other's negligence as a factor in determining liability.' °
This inability arises in two ways: first, a jurisdiction may not allow a
defendant-transferor to assert another's negligence as a defense against the
plaintiff-transferee;" and second, the forgery having been discovered and
the loss established, a jurisdiction may not allow a party to pass his loss
back onto prior handlers of the instrument. 12 In either situation, the loss,
occasioned by another's negligence, will be borne by a relatively innocent
party.
A. The General Rule
The system of loss allocation in the case of forged indorsements was
designed, under the pre-Code law, to place the resulting loss on the forger,
6. Losses on bank checks caused by the forgery of the drawer's signature will not be considered;
nor will losses caused by the forgery of both the drawer's signature and a necessary indorsement.
7. See text accompanying notes 13-23 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 24-30 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 31-40 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 41-51 infra.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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or in cases of his unavailability or unsuitability for suit, upon the first
person to trust the forger. t3 This was accomplished by refusingto permit a
drawee bank that had paid a check over a forged indorsement to charge the
account of the drawer for the amount of the check since the drawee had not
paid the instrument "in strictest accordance with the direction of its
depositor."' 4 Recourse could be had, however, by the drawee bank against
the person or bank who presented the check for payment. Such recovery
was justified by one of several theories, the two most preeminent being that
either a mistake of fact induced the payment 5 or the person presenting the
instrument had breached a warranty of good title.16 The warranty
breached in these situations was either implied upon presentment or
imposed by sections 65 and 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. ' 7 Thus
the loss occasioned by the payment of the check over the forged
indorsement worked its way back along the chain of transferors to the first
person to trust the forger, as the forgers themselves are notoriously
immune to judgments. The policy of this loss allocation system is clear: the
person taking the check from the forger is often in the best position to
prevent the forgery by requiring identification or by knowing the person
with whom he is dealing.' 8 In addition, while a drawee bank is bound to
know the signatures of its own customers, t9 it could not be expected to
examine and recognize the authenticity of every indorsement signature on
every check drawn by its customers.20
An identical allocation of losses from forged indorsements results
under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. When a drawee
pays a check on which a necessary indorsement is forged, 2' the drawer,
absent other circumstances, may compel the drawee bank to recredit the
13. Note, Allocation of Losses From Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 421 (1953).
14. Callaway v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 195 F.2d 556,560 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
15. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, I Hill 287 (N.Y. 1841).
16. Security Sav. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1939); Judge v. West
Philadelphia Title & Trust Co., 68 Pa. Super. 310 (1917).
17. Security Say. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1939); Judge v. West
Philadelphia Title & Trust Co., 68 Pa. Super. 310 (1917).
18. H. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS § 23.20 (5th ed. 1979).
19. Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
20. BAILEY, supra note 18, at § 23.20.
21. Not all indorsements are necessary to the proper negotiation of a check. When an instrument
by its terms is payable to the order or assigns of any person specified on the instrument with reasonable
certainty, when it is payable to a person or his order, or when it is conspicuously designated on its face
as "exchange" or the like and names a payee it is "order" paper. U.C.C. § 3-110. Such an instrument
may be negotiated in the first instance only by the indorsement of and delivery from the payee. U.C.C. §
3-202. If the item is so transferred the transferee becomes a "holder" of the instrument. U.C.C. § 1-
201(20). If an instrument is payable to bearer, to cash, or to an otherwise non-specified payee, the
instrument is "bearer" paper and can be negotiated by delivery alone. U.C.C. §§ 3-111, 3-202. Any
transferee of a bearer instrument may be a holder. U.C.C. § 1-201(20). Finally, an indorsement that
specifies the person to whom or to whose order the instrument is payable is a special indorsement and
requires the indorsement of the person so specified for further negotiation. U.C.C. § 3-204. Thus, the
indorsements of the payee on order paper and of the special indorsee on either order or bearer paper are
necessary for a transferee to acquire good title to the instrument through negotiation.
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drawer's account since the item is "not properly payable. 22 This loss of the
drawee may, however, be passed back to previous indorsers by actions on
the warranties of good title that the indorsers make to the drawee pursuant
to sections 3-417 and 4-207 of the Code.23 Thus, the loss will finally come to
22. Under U.C.C. § 4-401, a bank may charge against its customer's account only items that are
properly payable. See J. WHITE & R. SUMIERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 15-3 at 585 (2d ed. 1980). Payment of an instrument on which a necessary
indorsement is forged constitutes payment of an item "not properly payable" since any unauthorized
signature is wholly inoperative as the signature of the person whose name is signed unless a ratification
or preclusion occurs. U.C.C. § 3-404.
23. U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1) (a), 4-207(1) (a). The section 4-207(1) warranties are made by each
customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of the item and by each prior customer
and collecting bank to the payor bank or other payor who in good faith pays or accepts the item. The
section 3-417 warranties are made by any person who obtains payment or acceptance of the instrument
and by any prior transferor to a person who in good faith pays or accepts it. The differences in the
application of the two sections are not important to this discussion but are examined in WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 22, at 600 n.47. The relevant portions of the texts of these sections are set out
below.
§ 3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer
(I) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior transferorwarrants to
a person who in good faith pays or accepts that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unauthorized,
except that this warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether or not the
drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took the draft after the
acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's
signature was unauthorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that this warranty is not given
by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made prior to the
acceptance if the holder in due course took the draft after the acceptance,
even though the acceptance provided "payable as originally drawn" or
equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made after the
acceptance.§4-207. Warranties of Customer and Collecting Bank on Transfer or Presentmentof Items;
Time for Claims
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance ofan item and
each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other payor who in
good faith pays or accepts the item that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on
behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unauthorized,
except that this warranty is not given by any customer or collecting bank that is a
holder in due course and acts in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether or not the
drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of an item if the holder in due course took the item after the
acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's
signature was unauthorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered, except that this warranty is not given by any
customer or collecting bank that is a holder in due course and acts in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
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rest upon the forger of the indorsement or the first solvent party after the
forger.
B. Estoppel and Lack of Good Faith
Acts of the parties in uttering or handling an instrument may alter the
ordinary application of the above rules for allocation of losses caused by
forged indorsements of checks. Many of the Code sections in this area. are
merely statutory enshrinements of the pre-Code rules. For example,
section 3-404 of the Code recognizes that a person may ratify an
unauthorized signature for any purpose under Article Three or be
precluded from denying the authority of the signature.24 Therefore, the
signature would be valid to the extent of its effect as a signature.25 While it
was clear that unauthorized signatures could be ratified under pre-Code
law, there was a divergence of opinion regarding whether forgeries could
be ratified.2 6 Subsection (2) of 3-404 was intended by the Code drafters to
adopt the rule that both types of signatures could be ratified.27 Thus, when
a drawee bank pays a check over a forged indorsement that the named
person had ratified or is precluded from denying, as in the case of apparent
agency, the loss falls upon the person ratifying or so precluded instead of
the person responsible for the unauthorized or forged signature. Section 3-
405 describes another situation in which a person's actions affect the
allocation of loss. This section, which is an enlargement of the imposture
rules contained in section 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
enumerates three situations in which an indorsement by any person in the
name of the named payee is effective to pass title to the instrument.28 In
each of these enumerated instances, the maker or drawer has been duped
into issuing the instrument. When this occurs, the drawer of the check will
usually bear the loss because the drawee normally will charge the drawer's
account for the item and the drawer will be unable to assert effectively that
the item was not properly payable.
Finally, when the drawee lacks good faith in paying or accepting an
instrument, the Code prevents the passing of its loss on the unauthorized
(iii) to the acceptor of an item with respect to an alteration made prior to the
acceptance if the holder in due course took the item after the acceptance,
even though the acceptance provided "payable as originally drawn" or
equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor of an item with respect to an alteration made after the
acceptance.
These warranties run with the item so that a bank can sue a remote transferor directly and thus
avoid a multiplicity of suits and any problems caused by, for example, the insolvency of any
intermediate transferor. U.C.C. § 3-417, comment 8; § 4-207, comment 2.
24. U.C.C. § 3-404.
25. U.C.C. § 3-404, comment 3.
26. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 23 (superseded 1951); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 978
(1944).
27. U.C.C. § 3-404, comment 3.
28. U.C.C. § 3-405(1), and Official Comments thereunder.
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indorsement to prior transferors.29 Such transferors make their warranties
only to persons who pay or accept the instrument in good faith."0
C. Effect of Negligence on Loss Allocation
Under pre-Code law, the rules concerning allocation of losses were
also altered when a person was negligent in dealing with a check. For
example, if a drawer were negligent in the issuance of a check, the drawee
may be excused from paying out the drawer's funds in an unauthorized
manner.3 1 Similarly, the negligence of the drawee bank precluded its
ability under pre-Code law to charge the drawer for payment of a check
over a forged indorsement or to recover that payment from prior
transferors of the instrument.32
The Code's system of loss allocation when negligence is present is
closely analogous to pre-Code law. 33 If the drawer's negligence substantial-
ly contributes to the making of an unauthorized signature on the
instrument the drawer would be precluded from asserting that unauthoriz-
ed signature against a drawee who pays the instrument in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards.34 Although this rule
was not codified in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), it is a
direct outgrowth of the doctrine of Young v. Grote.35 In that case a man
going abroad left checks with his wife, which she filled out in such a
manner that they were easily altered. The court held that leaving checks
with a woman rather than a man of business was negligent.36 More broadly
stated, the court's holding was that "a drawer who so negligently draws an
instrument as to facilitate its material alteration is liable to a drawee who
pays the altered instrument in good faith." 37
Similarly, section 4-406 of the Code had no direct predecessor in the
29. U.C.C. § 3-417(1), § 4-207(l).
30. Id.
31. Young v. Grote, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827). For a discussion of this and other instances
in which a drawer's negligence defeats his claim against the drawee under pre-Code law, see Whaley,
Negligence and Negotiable Instruments 53 N.C. L. REV. 1,4 (1975). See also Annot., 39 A.L.R. 2d 641
(1955).
32. First Nat'l Bank v. Guaranteed State Bank, 106 Okla. 85,233 P. 183 (1925); National Bank
of Commerce v. First Nat'l Bank, 51 Okla. 787, 152 P. 596 (1915); Cf. Frankini v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666,88 P.2d 790 (1939) (instrument contained forgeries of
both the drawer and payee's names.)
33. Note, supra note 13, at 461.
34. U.C.C. § 3-406. The full text of that section reads:
§ 3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Unauthorized Signature
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration of
the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the
alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other
payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable
commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
35. 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
36. Id. at 767.
37. U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 1.
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NIL. Instead it replaced various state statutes dealing with like problems.38
This section imposes a duty upon drawers to examine their bank
statements within a certain time limit.39 Accordingly, it precludes drawers
from asserting certain forgeries and alterations against a drawee bank that
observes reasonable commercial standards when those drawers fail to
examine their statement within the designated time limits.
In each of the above situations, absent other circumstances, the loss
from a forged indorsement shifts to the "negligent" drawer, rather than to
some other person. Although the drawer did not intend payment, he would
be unable to force the drawee to recredit his account and would remain
liable to the true payee on the underlying obligation.40
Although the negligence of the drawer of a check is often available to
the drawee as a defense against a suit by the drawer charging improper
payment of the check, that negligence does not necessarily provide a
defense to other parties upon whom liability might be thrust. Under pre-
Code law the drawer's negligence generally was not available to a
collecting bank as a defense when sued by the drawee bank or other
subsequent transferee of the instrument.4' It is not clear, however, whether
a defense against the drawee based upon the negligence of the drawer is
unavailable to a collecting bank under the Code. Some commentators
maintain that the pre-Code rule of unavailability of defenses is clearly
continued in the Code.42 Section 4-406 unequivocally requires that, when a
drawer complains of improper payment, the drawee must raise any
defenses based upon the customer's failure to examine his statement
promptly or upon the time limits for reporting unauthorized signatures,
indorsements, or alterations in order to preserve certain warranty actions
against prior transferors.43 It is not certain, however, whether other
defenses, such as the drawer's negligent issuance that leads to a material
alteration, need be raised. The official comments indicate that the drafters
of Article Four intended to limit the scope of section 4-406(5) to the
defenses enumerated in that section.44 The drafters of those comments
recognized that while a similar principle might be applied to other
defenses, they did not intend to extend the rule to those situations by their
drafting of section 4-406.4
38. U.C.C. § 4-406, comment 1.
39. See notes 65-85 and accompanying text infra.
40. U.C.C. § 3-804 allows recovery by the true owner of a stolen instrument from anyone liable
thereon "upon due proof of his ownership, the facts which prevent his production of the instrument and
its terms."
41. American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616,204 N.Y.S. 621, affd, 210
A.D. 885,206 N.Y.S. 879 (1924); United States Mortgage &Trust Co. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 112 Misc.
149,184 N.Y.S. 32 (1920), affd, 195 A.D. 890,185 N.Y.S. 957 (1921); BAILEY, supra note 18, at § 23.25.
42. Note, supra note 13, at 470-71, n.288; HART & WILLIER, [1976] BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. (COM.
PAPER) § 12.39 (4).
43. U.C.C. § 4-406(5), and comment 7.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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It is generally accepted that section 3-405 may be raised as a defense by
a depositary or other collecting bank against a drawee in a warranty suit
when the drawee had not asserted this defense against the drawer.46 Several
commentators have concluded that the section 3-406 negligence defenses
should also be available to a depositary bank.47 A few courts, although
in dictum, have agreed.48 But in Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Merchants Bank,49 the court rejected the reasoning of those cases and
instead continued the pre-Code law of New York, which held that a payor
bank could waive defenses against customers based on negligent prep-
aration or delay in reporting alterations of the instrument and instead
proceed against a prior transferor on a warranty theory.50 Therefore, when
the drawee decides not to assert a defense against its drawer based upon
section 3-406 negligence, the collecting bank usually must absorb a loss for
which it was not primarily responsible.5 1 The fact situation that faced the
court in Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank presented a prime
example of this inequitable allocation of loss. In Girard, the federal district
court had to determine whether New Jersey likewise would permit the
drawee bank to waive such defenses against its customers, or would instead
force the drawee to assert those defenses before seeking compensation
from a collecting bank.
III. Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank
A. Facts and Holding of the Case
In Girard the drawer, Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, issued
on August 4, 1977, a $28,000 check to one of its policy holders, Morris
Lefkowitz, as a return of policy premium. The check was drawn on the
Girard Bank of Philadelphia and was to be sent to the Penn Mutual agency
in New York for distribution to Lefkowitz. The check was never received
by Lefkowitz. Instead, it was deposited in the Mount Holly State Bank by
one Darlene Payung on August 5. At this time, the check bore the forged
46. E.g., First Pa. Banking and Trust Co. v. Montgomery County Bank &Trust Co., 29 Pa. D. &
C.2d 596, 81 MONTG. Co. L. REv. 160 (1962).
47. Whaley, supra note 31, at 21; WHITE& SUMMERS, supra note 22, at 630 n.53 (arguing that a §
3-406 defense should be available to the depositary bank in a direct suit by the drawer.)
48. Stone & Webster Eng'r. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1,9, 184 N.E.2d
358. 363 (1962); Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 141 N.J. Super. 539, 544,358 A.2d 859, 862 (Dist. Ct. 1976);
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank, 64 Misc.2d 959, 960, 316 N.Y.S.2d
507, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Society Nat'l Bank v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1, 7,281 N.E.2d
563, 566-67 (1972).
49. 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (not otherwise reported).
50. Official Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 4-406 indicates that the section was intended to overrule the
holding of cases such as Fallick v. Amalgam. Bank, 232 A.D. 127, 249 N.Y.S. 238 (1931). That case
allowed the payor bank to waive a defense based upon a forged indorsement of the payee's name. Id. at
130,249 N.Y.S. at 241. The Mellon court, however, relying upon the language of Official Comment I of
section 4-406, interpreted Fallick as also allowing a waiver of a defense based upon a delay in reporting
material alterations, and held that only this defense was overruled by § 4-406. 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at
694.
51. For a discussion of the unavailability of suit by a depositary bank against a negligent drawer,
see text accompanying notes 101-22 infra.
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signature of the payee as an indorsement. Upon deposit, Ms. Payung also
endorsed the check.52
Mount Holly sent the check through normal banking channels to the
Central Penn National Bank, which presented it for payment to the
drawer, Girard. Mount Holly received the full amount of the check from
Central Penn, which was paid by Girard. 3
On approximately August 19th, the New York agency of Penn
Mutual notified its Philadelphia office that the check had not been
received. On the same day, Mount Holly and Girard also were notified of
the nonreceipt. Mount Holly immediately froze Ms. Payung's account,
which by then had dwindled to $5600. 54
Girard bank brought this action against Mount Holly in the United
States District Court for New Jersey claiming that Mount Holly had
breached its presentment warranty of good title to the instrument.55
Mount Holly impleaded Ms. Payung and Penn Mutual, both of whom
filed cross-claims against the other. Girard then sought summary
judgment against Penn Mutual for the full amount of the check, and Penn
Mutual sought summary judgment dismissing Mount Holly's claim
against it.56 The court, which had jurisdiction through diversity of
citizenship,57 applied New Jersey law. 8
The court properly recognized that the forged indorsement of the
payee's signature prevented subsequent parties, here Mount Holly, from
obtaining good title to the check. Therefore, on presentment of the check
for payment by Central Penn, Mount Holly breached its warranty of good
title to Girard. 59 Absent an effective defense by Mount Holly, Girard
should have been able to recover from Mount Holly for payment of the
check.60
Mount Holly raised two major defenses.6' It first claimed that section
3-405(1) (C) of the Code rendered the forged indorsement effective when
the agent or employee of the drawer, here Ms. Payung, supplied the name
of the payee to the drawer while intending that the payee have no interest in
the instrument. Had the forged indorsement been effective, title would
52. 474 F.Supp. at 1229.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. U.C.C. § 4-207 (1) (a).
56. 474 F.Supp. at 1229-30.
57. Id. at 1230.
58. Id. at 1230, 1237-38.
59. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
60. Id.
61. 474 F.Supp. at 1231-36. A third defense was raised by Mount Holly. It argued that Girard
did not assert a claim for breach of warranty within a reasonable time after learning of the breach and
Mount Holly's liability was thereby discharged to the extent of any loss caused by such delay. U.C.C. §
4-207(4). The court concluded, however, that no genuine issue of material fact was raised that would
preclude summary judgment on this issue. The report indicates that Mount Holly and Girard both
learned of the missing check on the same day, August 19th. 474 F.Supp. at 1231.
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have passed to subsequent takers by the forgery, and Mount Holly would
not have breached its warranty of good title. Mount Holly asserted that it
was able to show that the check made payable to Lefkowitz was stolen by
an employee of Penn Mutual.62 It was not disputed, however, that Penn
Mutual intended to pay the check to the true Lefkowitz. The dishonest
employee therefore had not supplied the name of Lefkowitz to his
employer intending that the named payee not have an interest in the check.
Furthermore, the New Jersey courts had held that section 3-405(1) (C) is
not applicable when checks in payment of a true debt of the employer are
converted by an employee.63 Consequently, the Girard court held that
section 3-405 provided no defense to Mount Holly.
64
Mount Holly argued additionally that section 4-406(5) provided it
with an effective defense against Girard's breach of warranty claim.61 It
first argued that the forged indorsement was an "alteration" of the
instrument within the meaning of section 4-406(1).66 The failure of Penn
Mutual to exercise reasonable care in reporting this alteration would,
according to Mount Holly, give Girard a valid defense against Penn
Mutual. 67 Because Girard had failed to assert this defense, it would be
62. 474 F.Supp. at 1229.
63. Snug Harbor Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 105 N.J. Super. 572,253 A.2d 581 (App. Div.
1969), Afj'd per curiam, 54 N.J. 95, 253 A.2d 545 (1969).
64. 474 F. Supp. at 1232.
65. Id. U.C.C. § 4-406 reads as follows:
§ 4-406. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Unauthorized Signature or Alteration
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by items paid
in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement and items pursuant to a
request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a reasonable manner makes the
statement and items available to the customer, the customer must exercise reasonable care
and promptness to examine the statement and items to discover his unauthorized signature or
any alteration on an item and must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to comply with
the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the customer is precluded from asserting
against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank also establishes
that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure; and
(b) an unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any other item
paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and statement was available to the
customer for a reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calendar days and before
the bank receives notification from the customer of any such unauthorized signa-
ture or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer establishes lack of
ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s).
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank a customer
who does not within one year from the time the statement and items are made available to the
customer (subsection (1)) discover and report his unauthorized signature or any alteration on
the face or back of the item or does not within 3 years from that time discover and report any
unauthorized indorsement is precluded from asserting against the bank such unauthorized
signature or indorsement or such alteration.
(5) If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim of a customer
upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon request to assert the
defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank or other prior party presenting or
transferring the item a claim based upon the unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise
to the customer's claim.
66. 474 F. Supp. at 1234.
67. U.C.C. § 4-406(2).
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precluded by section 4-406(5) from asserting a warranty claim against
Mount Holly.
The court held, however, that under New Jersey law the term
"alteration" did not include a forged indorsement.66 Moreover, the court
held that Girard was not required by section 4-406(5) to raise a section 3-
406 defense against Penn Mutual in order to preserve a claim against prior
transferors for breach of the presentment warranty.69 In reaching the latter
holding the court addressed several major policy problems created by the
statutory scheme of loss allocation on forged indorsements. The court
recognized that a rule which allowed the drawee to waive section 3-406
defenses and instead sue prior transferors on a warranty theory created a
lack of remedy problem for the collecting bank.70 The bank could not pass
the loss to the forger when he is unavailable and the Code provides no
mechanism for a collecting bank to transfer the loss to the negligent
drawer. Furthermore, allowing the drawee to waive its defense against the
drawer based upon the drawer's negligence thwarts the objective of loss
allocation by negligence and hinders the effectiveness of Code provisions,
such as section 3-406, that are designed to make drawers more careful .7
Finally, the court recognized that depositary/ collecting banks are often in
no better position than the drawee to deter forgery of indorsements even
when following reasonable commercial standards. 7 2 The court main-
tained, however, that the intention of the Code drafters was clearly stated
in Official Comment 7 to section 4-406 as making no provision for such a
defense for the collecting bank.73
Prior cases under both the U.C.C. and pre-Code law apparently had
split on the question whether a drawee bank must use all of its available
defenses against the drawer before proceeding against the collecting bank
for breach of warranty. The pre-Code position in New York was that the
warranties of prior collecting banks created absolute obligations on the
part of the transferors, which were not affected by the negligence of the
drawer.74 The drawee bank, therefore, did not need to assert negligence
68. 474 F. Supp. at 1233-34. The court supported this holding in four ways: (1) New Jersey Study
Comment I to § 4-406 asserts that that section does not require the scrutiny of indorsements on
returned checks by the drawer; (2) a perceived redundancy in subsections (2) and (4) if forged
indorsements were to be encompassed in both of the terms "unauthorized signature" and "alteration";
(3) reliance on Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties Trust Co., 169 N.J. Super. 488,492,404
A.2d 1288, 1290 (1979), which held that unauthorized indorsements were not encompassed by § 4-
406(1); and (4) reliance on Society Nat'l Bank v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1,281 N.E.2d 563
(1972), which held that the term "alteration" in § 4-406(1) did not refer to forged indorsements. 474 F.
Supp. at 1234.
69. Id. at 1236.
70. Id. at 1235. See Whaley, supra note 31, at 21.
71. 474 F. Supp. at 1235.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1236. See discussion in note 44 and accompanying text supra.
74. Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank, 232 A.D. 127, 130, 249 N.Y.S. 238, 242(1924); National Sur.
Corp. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 188 Misc. 207, 210, 70 N.Y.S.2d 636, 639-40 (New York Mun. Ct.),
aff'd, 188 Misc. 213, 70 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1946); American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Yorkville Bank,
122 Misc. 616, 622, 204 N.Y.S. 621, 627, aff'd, 210 A.D. 885, 206 N.Y.S. 879 (1924).
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defenses against the drawer before suing the collecting banks for breach of
warranty. Such a rule, which allows the drawee bank to avoid litigation on
the question of the drawer's negligence, was thought necessary to promote
the transferability of these instruments in commerce.75 Some states
indicated that forgery losses of this type were a business risk that collecting
banks took upon themselves.76 Other states, however, held that when a
drawee bank had valid negligence defenses against a drawer that it failed to
assert, it sustained no loss for which it could seek indemnification in a
warranty action.77
It appeared as if this latter view would prevail under the Code. Indeed,
the courts of various states, in dicta, have recognized that the drawee, in
effect, has caused its own loss when it fails to assert valid claims.78 In
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank,79 a lower
New York court expressly held that the drawee must have asserted section
3-406 negligence defenses against the drawer before it could sue prior
transferors for breach of the warranty of no material alterations imposed
by section 4-207(1) (C).8° In Canadian Imperial a check was altered to raise
the face amount by $37,000. The drawee paid the check and then sought
reimbursement from prior indorsers. 81 The drawee's motion for summary
judgment was denied until discovery proceedings on the question of the
drawer's negligence were completed.82 The court held:
[I]f plaintiff has a valid defense against the drawer because the drawer was
negligent in making the check and if plaintiff has waived that defense or has
failed to assert the defense upon request, plaintiff payor bank may not assert
its claim based upon the alteration against the defendant collecting banks. 3
The federal district court in Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Merchants Bank of New York, 84 however, rejected the holding of the
Canadian Imperial case, maintaining that the New York Court of Appeals
would not reach the same result. The federal court in Girard followed the
75. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 112 Misc. 149, 151,184 N.Y.S.
32, 33 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd, 195 A.D. 890, 185 N.Y.S. 957(1921), aff'd, 201 A.D. 838, 192 N.Y.S. 955
(1922).
76. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 189, 104 A.2d 288, 302 (1954).
77. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Federal State Bank, 206 Mich. 8, 172 N.W. 390 (1919); Jones Bros.
v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 106 Okla. 162, 164-65, 233 P. 472, 474 (1923).
78. East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 50 Ala. App. 576,581,281 So.2d 431,435 (Civ.
App. 1973) (defense available when collecting bank is impleaded in a drawer-drawee suit); Stone &
Webster Eng'r. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 9, 184 N.E.2d 358, 363 (1962).
79. 64 Misc.2d 959, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
80. "Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an
item . . . warrants to the payor bank . . . that . . . (c) the item has not been materially
altered .. "U.C.C. § 4-207(1).
The defense raised in this case is different from a defense based upon the bank customer's failure to
promptly notify the bank of a material alteration in U.C.C. § 4-406(2) and (5).
81. 64 Misc.2d 959, 959-60, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508.
82. Id. at 961-62, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 509-510.
83. Id. at 961, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
84. 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (not otherwise reported).
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reasoning of the Mellon court and denied such a defense to collecting
banks despite countervailing policy considerations.85
Because the court was unwilling to allow Mount Holly to assert the
defense of Penn Mutual's section 3-406 negligence against Girard in the
latter's section 4-207 breach of warranty suit, the court granted summary
judgment against Mount Holly in favor of Girard Bank for the amount of
the check. Mount Holly thus was left to absorb a loss caused, arguably, by
Penn Mutual's own negligence. Under the Code's system of loss allocation
there was no manner by which Mount Holly could assert this loss against
the negligent party.
86
B. Analysis-The Court's Denial of an Action for the
Collecting Bank under the U. C. C.
Placing the loss for forged indorsements upon collecting banks
arguably fails to achieve the objectives that are necessary in a system of loss
allocation on negotiable instruments. One commentator has suggested
that the goal of any system of allocation of forgery losses is to "facilitate
good business practices" and to "allocate losses as equitably as possible."87
To achieve these results courts have suggested four specific objectives of
such a system: (1) placing the loss upon the best risk bearer; (2) placing the
loss upon the negligent party; (3) uniformity of result in the application of
these standards; and (4) promotion of transferability of negotiable
instruments. 88 Two additional objectives have been suggested by the Code
drafters and other courts: (5) ascertaining liability on or effectiveness of
payment by a negotiable instrument as quickly as practicable-"finality of
payment"; and (6) avoiding circuity of legal actions.89
It is unclear whether allowing liability to fall upon the collecting bank
rather than upon the negligent drawer would distribute the loss to the best
risk bearing party. Indeed, as the court in Girard noted, many large issuers
of checks are in an equally good position to insure against forgery losses.
Certainly this was true of Penn Mutual Insurance Company and the
Mount Holy State Bank. When the drawer is an individual, however, as is
often the case, it may be somewhat easier for the depositary bank to absorb
the loss.
Placing liability upon the depositary bank does not achieve the
objectives of distributing the loss by negligence or uniformity of
application. The result is clearly contrary to the objective of allocating loss
to the negligent party since the drawee effectively may insulate its drawer
85. See notes 52-73 and accompanying text supra.
86. The U.C.C. provides for no cause of action based upon negligence. All the Code provisions
dealing with negligence are couched in terms of defenses based upon the negligence of the party seeking
recovery. Compare § 3-406 with §§ 3-407(2), 4-406(2), 4-406(4) and 4-406(5).
87. Note, supra note 13, at 433.
88. Id. at 433-34 nn. 74-77.
89. See U.C.C. § 3-418, and the Comments thereto; Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 275 Cal. App.2d 1, 4, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (1969).
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from the effects of the drawer's own negligence. Nor is uniformity of
application realized when the forgery loss is allocated solely on the basis of
the drawee bank's unregulated decision to assert, or not assert, a
negligence defense against the drawer. The only possible restriction on the
drawee's actions is the Code's imposition of the obligation of good faith;90
this argument, however, has not been discussed in any of the reported
cases.
Transferability of negotiable instruments is arguably not promoted
by placing a forgery loss upon an innocent party-here a collecting bank
observing reasonable commercial standards. Imposing liability in this
situation would seem only to lessen the likelihood that a party would agree
to transfer the instrument for payment.
The only two valid policy bases for imposing this liability on the
collecting bank are promoting finality of payment and avoiding circuity of
legal actions. The first would be accomplished by imposing a duty on
depositary banks to recognize the signature of the named payee-a duty
very similar to that imposed upon drawees to know their customer's
signature.9 Nevertheless, because depositary banks are often in no better
position to recognize forgery than later banks, this imposition of liability
may be inequitable.
Avoiding circuity of legal actions is obtained only by stopping the
flow of liability toward the negligent party at some point-here between
the collecting bank and the negligent drawer. This result, however, is
arbitrary, especially when based upon the nebulous concept, asserted by
some courts, of "lack of privity" between the drawer and the
depositary/collecting bank.92
A better method would be to require the drawee to assert the
negligence defense against the drawer but hold the collecting bank bound
by the determination of that issue. A similar solution, called for by one
commentator,93 would make the collecting bank bear the costs of the
drawee's litigation, as the collecting bank has breached its good title
warranty in any event. Either of these latter solutions could be
acomplished under a "vouching-in-warranty" procedure.
94
The Girard court nevertheless held that the Code does not
countenance an action for negligence by the depositary bank against the
drawer of the check, 95 nor does it require the payor bank to raise a section
90. U.C.C. § 1-203.
91. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
92. See discussion in notes 101-07 and accompanying text infra.
93. Whaley, supra note 31, at21.
94. The common law doctrine of vouching in warranty is supplemented by U.C.C. § 3-803. That
section allows a written notice to be given by a defendant in a commercial paper suit by which the
defendant tenders the defense of his action to the person who would be answerable over to him. If the
person so notified fails to come in and defend he will be bound in any action by the notifier against him
by any determination of fact common to the two litigations.
95. 474 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
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3-406 defense against the drawer before suing on a section 4-207
presentment warranty.96 The federal district court in Girard, however,
predicting New Jersey law, fashioned a solution to the depositary bank's
lack of remedy problem that was both innovative and yet consistent with
the Code provisions that the New Jersey Legislature had enacted. It
allowed the collecting bank to sue the drawer directly for negligence
outside the Code remedies.97
IV. COLLECTING BANK'S DIRECT NEGLIGENCE
ACTION AGAINST DRAWER
Prior to Girard, court cases uniformly had denied a direct action by a
collecting bank against the drawer for the latter's negligence. 98 The earlier
cases avoided analysis of the policy issues of loss allocation by imposing
artificial barriers of "privity" and "proximate cause." 99 Later cases, both
pre-Code and Code, followed the holdings of earlier cases without serious
question. 00 Both the Mellon and Girard courts thought this rule was
continued by the terms of the Code; the district court in Girard, however,
properly considered the objectives of a loss allocation system for forged
indorsements and held that the Code would permit development of a
common-law negligence action. The court also briefly considered how this
new action meshed with the existing Code machinery.
A. Existence of a Cause of Action
i. Pre-Code Position and Rationale
Although there is a dearth of authority, it appears to have been the
pre-Code rule that a drawer's negligence that contributed to a forged
indorsement could not be the basis of a claim by the collecting bank that
was forced to make good on its warranties of good title to the drawee.'l°
The reasons given by courts for this result are several. A Supreme Court of
New York explained:
The real and underlying reason why the negligence of the drawer constitutes
no defense to the collecting [banks] are that there is no privity between the
96. Id. at 1234-36.
97. Id. at 1239-40.
98. See text accompanying note 101 infra.
99. See text accompanying notes 102-07 infra.
100. See text accompanying notes 108-11 infra.
101. Ocala Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n v. Munroe & Chambliss Nat'l Bank, 89 Fla. 242, 103 So. 609
(1925); Bank of New York v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 195 Misc. 812, 82 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct.
1948), affd, 275 A.D. 932,90 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 503,93 N.E.2d 71 (1950); American
Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616, 204 N.Y.S. 621 (1924), aff'd, 210 A.D. 885, 206
N.Y.S. 879 (1924); Mfrs. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Misc. 339, 168 N.Y.S. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1918);
Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768 (1949); Second Nat'l
Bank v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 206 Pa. 616, 56 A. 72 (1903).
The drawee would, of course, have to recredit its drawers account since, on paying over a forged
indorsement it had not paid the item according to its customers' strictest orders. See note 14 and
accompanying text supra.
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drawer and the collecting bank, . . . and the drawer owes to that bank no
duty of vigilance, . .. and no act of the collecting bank is induced by any act
or representation or admission of the drawer . . 102
Additional reasons given by courts for denying this cause of action were
couched in terms finding "lack of privity of contract"' 3 or finding that the
drawer's negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the collecting bank's
loss. 104
This labeling was merely a substitute for an analysis of the policy
reasons for placing liability on a particular party. For example, if"privity
of contract" is taken to mean the relationship between parties to a
contract,10 5 it has no place in a legal analysis based upon the effects of a
party's negligent, tortious conduct. But "privity of contract" may also be
used to express that "one person is under an obligation to the other."'0 6 If
that is the context in which courts use the phrase when deciding the
appropriateness of a collecting bank-drawer suit, then, again, the words
are no more helpful to this analysis than to say that the drawer's negligence
was not the "proximate cause" of the collecting bank's loss. In both
instances the answer is subsumed in the inquiry. All these phrases-
whether "lack of duty", "not the proximate cause", or "lack of privity"-
merely express the court's opinion that the "policy of the law will [not]
extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have
in fact occurred.' 0 7
The courts in prior decisions thus were merely using terminology to
mask their policy decision that the drawer ought not bear the loss caused
by forged indorsements.
2. The Courts under the U. C. C.-Mellon and Girard
Although several pre-Code courts realized that liability might
equitably be imposed on the drawer for losses caused by his negligence, 108
the first court decision applying the Code to this issue, Mellon National
102. American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616, 622, 204 N.Y.S. 621, 627
aff'd, 210 A.D. 885, 206 N.Y.S. 879 (1924) (citations omitted); accord, Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank,
232 A.D. 127, 249 N.Y.S. 238 (1931).
103. Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank, 232 A.D. 127, 249 N.Y.S. 238 (1931); Mfrs. Bank v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Misc. 339, 168 N.Y.S. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
104. American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616,204N.Y.S. 621 (1924),aff'd,
210 A.D. 885, 206 N.Y.S. 879 (1924).
105. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778 at 28 n.45 (1951).
106. Id. at § 778 at 28.
107. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 at 244 (4th ed. 1971); cf. L. GREEN,
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 11-43 (1927). See also CORBIN, supra note 105, § 778 at 28-29;
Whaley, supra note 31, at 24-25.
108. See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 195 Misc. 812, 832, 82
N.Y.S.2d 694,711 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 A.D. 932,90 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 503,93
N.E.2d 71 (1950), quoting City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 495:
"The doctrine of privity, however, is not so conclusive as it once was. Whether there may be negligence
under circumstances which would carry the tort liability of a depositor beyond his contract
undertaking (cf. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1139), we
do not stop to inquire, for the question is not here."
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Bank and Trust Co. v. Merchants Bank of New York,'0 9 failed to do so.
The Mellon court relied on the pre-Code New York decisions to decide
that there was no duty owing from the drawer to a collecting bank and,
hence, no privity between them." 0 As discussed previously,"' such
assertions shed little light on the reasons why a court decides not to impose
liability on the drawer, and are not helpful to this analysis. The court also
noted that an early draft of section 4-207 contained a provision similar to
section 4-406(5), 12 but would have required the drawee bank to assert all
negligence defenses against the drawer. 1 3 Because the New York Law
Commission expressed concern regarding the extent of the application of
this section, the Code drafters transferred the provision in revised form to
Section 4-406, where it now appears as subsection (5). 114 The Mellon court
apparently considered this to be a disapproval of the enlarged application
of the principle.
The Mellon court, however, held only that this cause of action did not
exist under pre-Code law or under section 3-406 of the Code. Apparently,
because the issue was not raised, the court did not consider whether such
an action might otherwise be available.1
5
The district court in Girard agreed that, for his negligence
contributing to a forged indorsement, the drawer of a check incurred no
liability to a collecting bank under section 3-406. Its holding, however, was
based upon different grounds than that of the Mellon court. First, Girard
decided that a collecting bank is not a holder-in-due-course, a drawee or
other payor within the meaning of 3-406. Thus, even if 3-406 could be used
as other than just a defensive weapon, a cause of action would not be
available to a collecting bank. 116 Second, it noted that Official Comment 5
to section 3-406 indicates that 3-406 does not impose tort liability upon a
negligent party."i7 The court nevertheless recognized a common law cause
of action for the depositary bank in negligence against the drawer. It noted
that no Code provision specifically precluded such an action. In addition,
it found that allowing this cause of action would remedy the problem cre-
ated when a drawee fails to assert the drawer's section 3-406 negligence in
an action against it for improper payment".. and then sues the collecting
bank for breach of warranty. Moreover, because this type of action would
109. 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (not otherwise reported).
110. Id. at 693.
Ill. See text accompanying notes 101-107 supra.
112. 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691, 693-94.
113. SUPPLEMENT No. I TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 31-32 (1955).
114. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
146, 163 (1957).
115. 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691, 695-96.
116. 474 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
117. Id. at 1239.
118. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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deter fraud and prevent forgery by placing the loss on the responsible
party, the court held that the Code section that incorporates supplemen-
tary principles of common law, section 1-103, would permit cognizance of
this action.' 19
Finally, the Girard court compared this new cause of action to
another development in several jurisdictions. Although not expressly
provided for by the Code, a few states permit a cause of action in
conversion by a nonnegligent drawer of a check against a collecting bank
who takes the instrument over a forged indorsement. While noting that
there is no uniformity on the availability of this action,120 the Girard court
recognized that the purpose of such suits is to place liability on the party
who could have most easily prevented the loss. 121 Applying the same
policy, when the negligent drawer of a check is the one who could most
easily have prevented the forgery by its exercise of due care, the Girard
court thought it proper to place liability upon the drawer.
22
B. Parameters of the Cause of Action
Before examining this new cause of action in light of the goals of a
commercial paper loss allocation system, its parameters should be
explored. The court in Girardlimited the availability of this cause of action
to the type of drawer's negligence that would give rise to a section 3-406
defense, not the type covered by the provisions of sections 3-405 or 4-406.
Furthermore, the court limited the new action to suits on forged
indorsements. It expressly did not pass on the propriety of a similar action
119. U.C.C. § 1-103. Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable
Unlets displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity,
including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent,
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
120. Compare Central Cadillac, Inc. v. Stern Haskell, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
California Mill Supply Corp. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 334,223 P.2d 849
(1950); Gregory-Salisbury Metal Products, Inc. v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 160 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App.
1964); Stone & Webster Eng'r. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358
(1962); First Nat'l Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 449, 14 A.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Life
Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 141 N.J. Super. 539, 358 A.2d 859 (Dist. Ct. 1976); and Lavanier v. Cosmopolitan
Bank & Trust Co., 36 Ohio App. 285, 173 N.E. 216 (1929) with Sun'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank,
21 Cal.3d 671, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978); Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 275 Cal. App.2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969); Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 306 I11. 179, 137 N.E. 793 (1922); Sidles Co. v. Pioneer Valley Say. Bank, 233 Iowa 1057, 8
N.W.2d 794 (1943); Home Indem. Co. v. State Bank, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943); Railroad
Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 142 Kan. 564, 51 P.2d 61 (1935); Levin v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 224 Md. 603, 168 A.2d 889 (1961); Underpinning & Foundation Constructors, Inc. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 N.Y.2d 459,386 N.E.2d 1319,414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 46 Pa. D. & C.2d 141 (C.P. 1966); and Commercial Ins. Co. v. First Security
Bank, 15 Utah 2d 193, 389 P.2d 742 (1964).
121. 474 F. Supp. at 1240, quoting Underpinning & Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 46 N.Y.2d 459, 468, 386 N.E.2d 1319, 1323, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298, 302 (1979).
122. 474 F. Supp. at 1240. A Louisiana appellate court has recently allowed a negligence action
to be brought against a drawer by a person in the position of a collecting bank. Koerner & Lambert v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So.2d 179 (La. App. 1979). In a confused opinion the court held that section 3-
406 precluded the drawer from asserting the plaintiff's breach of warranty. The court did not address
the question of the propriety of a negligence action against the drawer in its opinion.
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based upon a forged drawer's signature. 23 In addition, the court noted that
the depositary bank must have exhausted all attempts to obtain redress
from the forger himself before this negligence action could be instituted. 1
24
C. Effect of the Action in Attaining Objectives of a Risk Allocation
System.
Although the new cause of action remedies some of the deficiencies in
the present system of loss allocation and attains several of the objectives of
such a system, there remain several situations in which loss allocation
objectives would be thwarted. Allowing the depositary bank to pass its loss
from the forged indorsement to the negligent drawer should promote the
transferability of negotiable instruments in modern commerce. If a
collecting bank exercising reasonable care125 realizes that it will not bear
losses caused by someone else, it should be much less worried about
accepting these items for collection. How great an effect this would have on
the commercial world is uncertain, as the collecting bank must still bear
many of the costs of litigating and proving the negligence of the drawer.
Although transferability is enhanced, it is not clear whether imposing
the loss for forged indorsements upon the negligent drawer will place the
loss upon the party best able to bear this risk. A collecting bank would have
to spread the loss from the forgery, or the cost of insurance against such a
loss, among its customers or its owners. As past cases have suggested, this
may be one of the bank's costs of doing business.126 But it seems no less
equitable to force the drawer of the check to bear the costs of these losses.
In many instances it will be in a similar position to insure against these
losses or to bear them when they are uninsured. Imposing this liability will,
however, attain the objective of placing the loss from the forgeries upon the
negligent party. To this extent, such a cause of action will serve to reduce
these losses by discouraging the drawer's negligent actions.
Such an action does not, however, avoid circuity of legal actions.
Indeed, allowing this suit completes the circle of actions that started when
the drawer asserted a "not properly payable" claim against his drawee
bank. The drawee then sued a collecting bank and the liability passed up
along the chain of transferors to the first solvent party after the forger.
Now that this party may sue the drawer, the circle is complete. This loss
allocation objective would be more readily achieved by requiring the
drawee bank to assert the drawer's section 3-406 negligence before
proceeding against a collecting bank. 27 As noted above, the court
123. 474 F. Supp. at 1240.
124. Id. at 1241-42.
125. See the discussion of the effect of the collecting bank's negligence in the text accompanying
note 129 infra.
126. See note 76 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra; Professor Whaley calls for such a defense to be
raised by the drawee. He would have the collecting bank bear the expenses of this litigation since it has
breached its § 4-207 warranty. Whaley, supra note 31, at 20-21.
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decisions have not required assertion of this defense. 128 When third party
actions are available, however, the problem of circuity of action is not so
great because the liability for the forgery can be resolved in one
proceeding.
Nor is finality of payment enhanced by a new action for negligence,
since this action against the drawee adds to the uncertainty in the final
effect of dealing with bank checks. The additional liability that this cause
of action imposes upon drawers, however, occurs only in the instances
when previously the drawee bank had an effective defense against the
drawer but refused or failed to assert it, instead collecting from its prior
transferors. Such a drawer will be prejudiced very little by the minimal
delay in learning that its own negligence will be asserted against it in a
claim by a collecting bank rather than as a defense to its claim against the
drawer.
Although the cause of action partially aids achievement of the
objective of uniformity of result in most instances, it does create similar
problems of nonuniform application. In most instances, liability is no
longer placed upon the nonnegligent collecting bank at the whim of the
drawee. As the Girard court recognized, however, if both the collecting
bank and the drawee are negligent, determining which party will ultimately
bear the loss will depend upon whether or not the drawee asserts a
negligence defense against its drawer.129 If the drawee fails to assert a
negligence defense against the drawer, the collecting bank will bear the loss
as its contributory negligence will preclude it from asserting a negligence
action against the drawer. If the drawee does assert a negligence defense,
the drawer will bear the loss by the operation of 3-406. Furthermore, if the
jurisdiction allows a direct suit by the drawer against the collecting bank
either on a warranty or a conversion theory, but fails to allow the collecting
bank to assert the drawer's section 3-406 negligence as a counter-claim,
liability will fall upon the collecting bank.
V. A COMPARISON OF Two POSSIBLE REMEDIES
The court in Girard was faced with two possible methods of
transferring liability on forged indorsements from the collecting bank to
the negligent drawer. The first was to require the drawee of the check to
assert a section 3-406 defense against its negligent drawer in every
situation. It decided that no such requirement was mandated by the Code.
The court failed to consider whether such a requirement could be
developed at common law despite the number of decisions that could have
provided a theoretical base for such requirement.'3 ° Instead it chose to
allow the collecting bank to sue the negligent drawer directly once the
128. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
129. 474 F. Supp. at 1242.
130. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
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collecting bank was unable to pass its warranty liability onto the forger.
Although this result also was not provided for under the Code, the court
had little difficulty in allowing its development according to common law
principles.
The differences in the results of these two solutions deserve
consideration. Requiring the drawee to assert all defenses leads to more
standardized results since it would not allow the drawee to choose upon
whom the loss would fall when both the drawer and the collecting bank are
negligent. Instead, the drawer would bear the loss of the forged
indorsement unless the jurisdiction allowed a direct action to the drawer
against collecting banks but did not allow the collecting bank a section 3-
406 defense against the drawer. This solution would also avoid circuity of
legal action by stopping the flow of liability in the first instance.
Difficulties may arise when the drawee bank is not in the best position to
determine the drawer's negligence, but use of the vouching-in-warranty
procedure would effectively eliminate this problem.13 1 Use of this
procedure would also avoid the situation in which the drawee un-
successfully asserts the drawer's negligence but then must relitigate its
proper assertion of that negligence in a subsequent suit against the
collecting bank.
Allowing a direct suit by the collecting bank increases the number of
legal actions arising out of a single wrongdoing and may require the
involvement of a significantly greater amount of judicial resources. When
both parties are negligent, liability would be imposed on the collecting
bank-a result similar to that which obtained under pre-Code law. 312 In
addition, litigation on the central issue of the case, the negligence of the
drawer and the collecting bank, would occur between the two most
interested parties. Proof of negligence may be more difficult, however, by
the greater likelihood that the depositary bank, as opposed to the drawee,
will be in a different locality than the drawer.
Finally, requiring the drawee bank to assert a section 3-406 negligence
defense against its customer would avoid problems entailed in a direct
negligence suit. The Code drafters feared that uncertainty concerning the
ultimate loss would cause the litigation ultimately to be decided on the
unsatisfactory basis of burden of proof.3 3 Because of this fear, they
phrased section 3-406 in terms of a preclusion to recovery. 34 When the
drawer is met with a negligence defense by the drawee, "the task of
pursuing the wrongdoer [would be upon] the negligent party"-a result
contemplated by the Code drafters. 135 Although both solutions thus would
131. Whaley, supra note 31, at 21.
132. Alternatively, a direct suit may make easier the determination of the amount of each party's
liability in a comparative negligence state. See Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal.3d 671,
148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978).
133. U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 5.
134. See notes 33-34 supra,
135. U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 5.
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achieve the objectives of the Code drafters, requiring the assertion of all
defenses would achieve the purpose of the Code drafters in the manner
contemplated by them.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that the U.C.C. does leave gaps in its scheme
for allocating losses caused by forged indorsements on bank checks.
Accordingly, the collecting bank may be forced to absorb losses that it has
little opportunity to prevent and that were caused by the negligence of the
drawer of the checks. This Case Comment has considered that allocation
of loss and determined that the objectives of a negotiable instruments loss
allocation system would be better served by placing the loss upon the
negligent drawer. Of the two alternative solutions to this problem
considered in Girard, the federal district court chose to allow a direct suit
by the collecting bank against the negligent drawer of a check instead of
requiring the drawee bank to assert a section 3-406 defense against its
drawer before claiming a breach of the transferor's section 4-207 warranty.
Although the new cause of action remedies some of the problems in the
present loss allocation scheme, the result sought by the Girard court could
be better achieved by requiring the drawee to assert all negligence defenses
against the drawer. If such a defense is not asserted, the drawee bank has
caused its own loss and should not be able to pass that loss back to prior
transferors on their presentment warranties." '[H]e who loveth peril shall
perish in it.' . . . [W]here a person has a safe way and abandons it for one
of uncertainty, he can blame no one but himself . . ,. . Adequate
protection against multiple litigation of the same issue could be afforded
by use of the Code's vouching-in-warranty procedure. By adopting these
additional requirements for the drawee, states will "allocate losses
equitably" and "facilitate good business practices" in the use and handling
of bank checks.
Steven W. Mershon
136. Armstrong v. Pomeroy Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 524, 22 N.E. 866, 869 (1889).
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